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A crisis of enforcement:
The decriminalisation of death and injury at work
Professor Steve Tombs and Dr. David Whyte
Editorial
As Professor Steve Tombs and Dr. David Whyte illustrate in this brieﬁ ng, fatalities 
and injuries caused through work are far more prevalent than the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) currently reports. For example, they ﬁ nd that more than 80 per cent 
of ofﬁ cially recorded work-related fatalities are ﬁ ltered out from the HSE’s headline 
ﬁ gure and remain buried in other categories in the ofﬁ cial data. The ofﬁ cial data 
made available by HSE reporting methodology may thus only serve to mask the 
true quantity and quality of harm that takes place during work processes. After 
re-assessing the scale of the harms caused, Tombs and Whyte conclude that being 
a victim of a work-related fatality or injury is far more likely than experiencing 
conventionally deﬁ ned and measured violence and homicide. 
While such siphoning seems an inevitable and inherent characteristic of legal 
and regulatory systems, this brieﬁ ng suggests that it may be only through the 
acknowledgement of ‘safety crime’ by agencies such as the Home Ofﬁ ce, the police, 
the courts and the Scottish Government that safety crimes can be recast as ‘real’ 
crime and thus dealt with more appropriately.
The authors’ conclusion, that most safety crimes are either undetected or ﬁ ltered 
out from ofﬁ cial channels of resolution, begs the question whether burdens have 
been displaced to employees and members of the public.
In our view, ‘organisational violence’ in the form of safety crimes is clearly worthy of 
greater acknowledgement owing to the harm caused and the contexts within which 
they occur. Such crimes are ‘socially mediated’ in the sense that they are brought 
about by particular institutional and organisational operations which place human 
life and physical safety at risk. 
In the end, what gets deﬁ ned as crime and what doesn’t – and who gets to decide – are 
predominantly  political questions. The What is crime? project at the Centre for Crime 
and Justice Studies hopes to create a space for critical thinking about such questions.
Rebecca Roberts and Will McMahon,  Centre for Crime and Justice Studies
What is crime?
www.crimeandjustice.org.uk
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that deaths and injuries suffered 
at work usually result from infractions of the 
criminal law,1 those deaths and injuries remain 
unacknowledged as ‘crimes’, and are only very 
rarely processed by the criminal justice system. 
The decriminalisation of safety crimes has 
been encouraged by recent government policy 
developments. 
This brieﬁ ng:
● Estimates a more accurate ﬁ gure for the deaths  
and injuries caused by working and compares it to 
ofﬁ cial statistics provided by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE). 
● Examines how such deaths and injuries get 
ﬁ ltered out from the ofﬁ cial statistics and 
the processes by which these incidents are 
decriminalised. 
● Sets out the policy environment within which 
trends towards further decriminalisation are 
unfolding. 
● Indicates how this process of decriminalisation is  
reaching crisis point. 
Reference throughout this brieﬁ ng is made to 
injuries – fatal or otherwise – resulting from 
traumatic or acute incidents. We do not discuss 
deaths from occupational illness and cases of 
chronic ill-health, which run into tens of thousands, 
are grossly under-recorded and warrant their own 
consideration.
THE SCALE OF DEATHS AND 
NON-FATAL INJURIES
Fatal injuries
In 2006-2007, the HSE recorded a total of 241 
fatalities suffered by workers in Great Britain (HSE, 
2007). However, the data collated by the HSE on 
which this ﬁ gure is based are so incomplete that 
they need to be reconstructed to provide a more 
accurate indication of the scale of the problem. 
First, the data that the HSE presents refer only to 
fatal injuries to employees and the self-employed. 
This excludes the deaths to members of the public 
sustained through working environments which 
are recorded by the HSE. In 2006-2007, this total 
was 369. The HSE points out that some two-thirds of 
fatal injuries sustained by the public in any one year 
are the result of suicide or trespass onto railway 
systems. If we apply this estimate, 246 deaths for 
2006-2007 in this category can be excluded. When 
the resulting ﬁ gure of 123 is added to the HSE 
baseline ﬁ gure for workers (241), this produces a 
new running total of 364 deaths caused by work 
during that year.
Second, the most common measurement of 
occupational ‘safety’ is that used to record injury 
under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and 
Dangerous Occurences Regulations (RIDDOR), 
(HMSO, 1995) introduced in 1995. RIDDOR continues 
to exclude signiﬁ cant numbers of occupational 
deaths for which ofﬁ cially collected data exist. 
Numerically, the most signiﬁ cant is the exclusion 
of road trafﬁ c incidents – fatal injuries involving ‘at 
work’ vehicles – which account for at least 1,000 
deaths per annum (HSE/Department for Transport, 
2003). RoSPA has indicated that the underlying 
causes of these incidents are similar to those for 
occupational fatalities and injuries more generally 
(RoSPA 2008).  
Therefore, incorporating data on the public 
(excluding suicides and trespass on railways), road 
deaths and categories of deaths caused by working 
not recorded under RIDDOR2 increases the total 
of occupational deaths from the HSE’s ‘all workers’ 
ﬁ gure of 241 for 2006-2007 to a ﬁ gure of at least 
1,400. In other words, to obtain a more accurate 
ﬁ gure of ofﬁ cially recorded occupational fatalities, 
we need to apply a multiplier of between ﬁ ve and six 
to the HSE’s headline ﬁ gure.
Non-fatal injuries
If we turn now to non-fatal injuries our research 
shows that each category of non-fatal injury data 
provided by RIDDOR also suffers from signiﬁ cant 
under-reporting. A comparison of the non-fatal 
RIDDOR data with the more authoritative Labour 
Force Surveys, published by the Ofﬁ ce for National 
Statistics (see below), indicates that only about a 
quarter of reportable non-fatal injuries to employees, 
and probably about 5 per cent in the case of 
self-employed workers, are actually reported by 
employers. This indicates a widespread failure on the 
part of employers to meet their legal obligation to 
report incidents, itself an offence under safety law. 
1 The Health and Safety at Work Act 
(1974) is the principal criminal law  
statute that applies here. 
2 Also excluded are: injuries 
reportable under separate 
merchant shipping, civil aviation 
and air navigation legislation; 
injuries to members of the armed 
forces; and fatal injuries to the self-
employed arising out of ‘accidents’ 
at premises which the injured 
person either owns or occupies 
(source: http://www.hse.gov.
uk/statistics/sources.htm).
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Workplace injury is far from an uncommon 
experience. Typically the HSE records that 30,000 
major injuries are sustained by workers and 15,000 
non-fatal injuries are sustained by members of the 
public each year (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). Around 
120,000 injuries to workers which result in more 
than three days off work are also typically recorded 
in any given year. It is important to recognise 
that injuries are likely to be under-reported and 
under-recorded to a much greater degree than 
fatalities. Thus, for example, HSE data show that 
self-employed workers are twice as likely to be 
killed but four to ﬁ ve times less likely to sustain 
a major injury when compared to other workers. 
This reporting anomaly can only be explained by 
an appreciation of the relative difﬁ culty with which 
fatalities as opposed to injuries can be hidden. 
Put very crudely, it is more difﬁ cult to hide a body 
than it is to hide a broken wrist. A similar reporting 
effect – if for different reasons – can be found in the 
ﬁ gures for injuries to the public caused by working. 
In order to reconstruct the data on injuries usefully, 
then, we would need to apply a multiplier of much 
greater than ﬁ ve to six times HSE’s headline ﬁ gure.
In the majority of cases, deaths and injuries incurred 
as a result of working should be viewed as crimes of 
corporate violence. This has been deﬁ ned by Hills as:
‘Actual harm and risk of harm inﬂ icted on consumers, 
workers, and the general public as a result of 
decisions by corporate executives or managers, 
from corporate negligence, the quest for proﬁ ts at 
any cost, and wilful violations of health, safety and 
environmental laws.’     
(Hills, 1987:vii)
A focus on occupational injuries indicates that 
corporate violence is much more widespread than is 
appreciated, and remains widely under-reported.
Box 1
Labour Force Survey
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a sample 
survey of households in the UK carried out by 
the Office of National Statistics. The survey is 
organised quarterly and seeks information on 
respondents’ employment and labour market 
status. It is regarded as being more reliable than 
RIDDOR data in some respects since it relies upon 
confidential self-reporting of injuries, rather 
than the willingness of employers to report to 
the authorities. The level of around a quarter of 
all injuries being reported is supported by recent 
research into hospital patients commissioned 
by HSE (Davies, Kemp and Frostick, 2007), which 
indicates that 30 per cent of all injuries sustained 
at work leading to hospital treatment are reported 
to the HSE. If we assume that less serious injuries, 
not requiring hospitalisation, are more vulnerable 
to under-reporting, this research confirms 
reporting rates of less than 30 per cent for all 
injuries sustained at work.
Major injuries
According to RIDDOR reporting criteria, reportable 
major injuries are: fractures, other than to fingers, 
thumbs and toes; amputations; dislocations of 
the shoulder, hip, knee or spine; loss of sight 
(temporary or permanent); chemical or hot metal 
burn or any penetrating injury to the eye; injury 
resulting from an electric shock or electrical burn; 
injury leading to hypothermia or heat-induced 
illness requiring resuscitation or requiring 
admittance to hospital for more than 24 hours; 
unconsciousness caused by asphyxia or exposure 
to harmful substance or biological agent; acute 
illness requiring medical treatment, or loss of 
consciousness arising from absorption of any 
substance by inhalation, ingestion or through 
the skin; acute illness following exposure to a 
biological agent or toxic or infected material.
Over-three-day injuries
An over-three-day injury is, according to RIDDOR 
reporting criteria, one which is not ‘major’, but 
results in the injured person being away from work 
or unable to do their full range of normal duties for 
more than three days.
Non-fatal injuries to members of 
the public
These injuries are those which arise from work 
activity which result in the injured person being 
taken directly to hospital.
www.crimeandjustice.org.uk
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The hidden violent crime problem 
Despite the problems of working with the death 
and injury data available to us, comparisons can be 
drawn, no matter how crude, between violent crime 
recorded by the Home Ofﬁ ce and occupational 
deaths and injuries. 
First, in terms of deaths, we can compare the 
number of people killed at work with those 
recorded by the Home Ofﬁ ce as homicides (that is, 
murder, manslaughter and infanticide).3 The data 
in Table 1 allow us to make several observations. 
Initially it appears that one is twice as likely to be a 
victim of homicide in England and Wales than to die 
as a result of an acute workplace-related incident. 
However, against this, we need to bear in mind that 
the fatality data here are incomplete – at best they 
only capture between one-ﬁ fth and one-sixth (a 
range of 17 to 20 per cent) of occupational fatalities. 
As we can clearly see in Table 1, when we apply this 
multiplier, being a victim of a work-related fatality 
looks several times more likely than being a victim 
of homicide.
Second, a similar comparison can be made in relation 
to occupational injuries. According to the 2006-
2007 British Crime Survey (BCS), there were a total 
of 2,471,000 violent offences in England and Wales, 
and 3.6 per cent of people experienced a violent 
incident. Of these, 49 per cent resulted in no injury 
to the victim, about one in ten (12 per cent) required 
medical attention, and one in 50 (2 per cent) resulted 
in a hospital stay (Jansson, Povey and Kaiza, 2007). 
In absolute terms, this equates to some 49,420 BCS 
recorded incidents of violence resulting in a hospital 
stay. Now, we cannot disaggregate from HSE injury 
data those which similarly require a hospital stay. 
However, we do know that the kinds of injuries 
deﬁ ned under RIDDOR as ‘major’ (see Box 1) are 
serious enough to warrant at least hospital treatment, 
while the deﬁ nition of an injury to a member of the 
public is one that requires the injured person going 
straight to hospital. Thus, we can reasonably set 
against BCS data on violence resulting in a hospital 
stay HSE data for major injuries to workers and injuries 
to the public which, for 2006/07, stands at 29,450 
and 17,483 such injuries respectively.  Combining 
these two ﬁ gures produces a total - 46,933 – which 
is virtually the same as the ﬁ gure for BCS recorded 
violence requiring a hospital stay. And this is not even 
to begin to estimate the numbers of over-three-day 
injuries – 114,222 in 2006/07 – which resulted in 
hospitalisation (nor, of course, to account for the high 
levels of under-reporting). 
To make the comparison in percentage terms, again 
using data for 2006-2007, we ﬁ nd the percentage of 
workers experiencing a major injury stands at just 
under 0.1 per cent (0.097 per cent, or 97.1 in 100,000). 
This can be compared with the 0.072 per cent of BCS 
respondents (the 2 per cent of the 3.6 per cent who 
experienced violence) resulting in a hospital stay. 
Although such comparisons can only be broadly 
indicative, they do lead us to the rather undeniable 
conclusion – that work is much more likely to be a 
source of violence in Britain than those ‘real’ crimes 
recorded by the Home Ofﬁ ce. 
These observations raise questions about criminal 
justice responses to this violent crime problem. 
While we know that there are a whole series of social 
processes which obscure and recast safety crimes, 
their construction as something to be acted on and 
counted – not by police forces, nor by the Home 
Ofﬁ ce, nor by the Scottish Government - but by 
regulatory agencies, crucially reinforces the idea that 
TABLE 1 : REPORTED FATAL INJURIES TO WORKERS AND HOMICIDES, 2005-2006 4
All homicides in England and Wales 765
Rate of homicides per million population 14
Fatal injuries to all workers 217
Rate per million workers 7
All work-related fatal injuries (fatal injuries to ‘all workers’ x 5-6) c1,100-c1,300
Rate per million workers x 5-6 35-42
3 The absolute numbers are not 
wholly compatible in the sense 
that HSE data also cover Scotland. 
However, the key point of the 
comparison is with regard to rates.
4 The ‘rate’ ﬁ gures in this table have 
been rounded up to the nearest 
whole number. 2005-2006 data 
have been used here since these 
are the most recent available data 
for homicides in England and Wales.
www.crimeandjustice.org.uk
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safety crimes are not ‘real’ crimes. The institutional 
segregation of safety crimes by the state therefore 
has profound implications for how we regard them. 
Further, this means that we must look at what those 
agencies actually do if we are to discover more about 
how safety crime is deﬁ ned: for it is in investigative, 
administrative, enforcement and juridical processes 
that crime is recognised and deﬁ ned (Alvesalo, 2003). 
Filtering out safety crimes
Of course, not all injuries, fatal or otherwise, are 
crimes, and, as we shall see, certainly the vast 
majority are never treated formally as such by the 
criminal justice system. That said, we also know 
that the vast majority of these injuries do involve 
violations of law. HSE evidence, for example, 
consistently ﬁ nds that, despite the lack of formal 
enforcement activity, more than two-thirds of injuries 
to workers are the result of managements failing to 
meet their legal duties under criminal law (Pearce 
and Tombs, 1998:152-4). In other words, while we 
cannot quantify it with any degree of certainty, what 
we can be certain of is that safety crimes constitute 
a signiﬁ cant violent crime problem indicated by the 
data presented in this brieﬁ ng.
As we have seen, processes of reporting and 
recording combine to ﬁ lter out the majority of 
deaths and injuries from the ofﬁ cial ﬁ gures. A 
second ﬁ lter arises when a decision is made about 
whether to investigate, or not, as the case may be. 
There is no way of knowing how many recorded 
deaths, injuries or dangerous occurrences are 
actually investigated, since those investigation 
ﬁ gures are published by the HSE on a highly 
selective basis. However, research by the Centre 
for Corporate Accountability (Unison/CCA, 2002) 
found that, in a ﬁ ve-year period, 75 worker deaths 
and 212 deaths of members of the public were not 
investigated. Subsequent research found that, in 
2006/7, only 10.5 per cent of major injuries resulted 
in an investigation by the HSE. Thus, 89.5 per cent 
remain uninvestigated, including: 62 per cent of all 
amputations; 70 per cent of all asphyxiations and 
poisonings; 78 per cent of all burns; 57 per cent of 
all electrocutions; and 91 per cent of all temporary 
or permanent blindness (CCA, 2008).
A third ﬁ lter comes in when a decision is made 
about whether or not to initiate any form of 
enforcement action. When inspectors come across 
breaches of the law and they decide to act on 
those breaches, prosecution is used much less 
readily than other types of enforcement action. 
Applying a very rough and ready reckoner, the ratio 
of administrative (improvement and prohibition) 
notices to prosecutions is 7:1.5 If injuries are 
investigated, then only 11 per cent of those 
investigations will result in prosecution (Unison/
CCA, 2002). An internal audit undertaken by the HSE 
in July 2006 provides a rare and revealing picture 
of how the HSE assesses its prosecution practice. Of 
126 randomly selected investigations, only seven 
resulted in prosecutions. Yet the audit concluded 
that 19 should have been prosecuted. The incidents 
that should have been prosecuted, but were not, 
included one death, six major injuries, two over-
three-day injuries and two dangerous occurrences 
(HSE, 2006). 
In short, we can conclude from this review of the 
available evidence that most safety crimes – 
including many of the most serious crimes – remain 
undetected. If they are detected, they are likely to be 
ﬁ ltered out by the processes we describe here.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR 
DECRIMINALISATION
Understanding these ﬁ ltering processes allows us 
to view the different treatment of safety crimes as 
rooted in the politics and practices of criminal justice 
rather than in the intrinsic quality of those types of 
offences. The decriminalisation of safety crimes can 
only be fully understood within its political context. 
Within the current political context there are two 
tendencies at play which particularly inﬂ uence these 
processes of decriminalisation. 
First, there has been a consistent erosion of HSE 
stafﬁ ng numbers that we can pinpoint to the 
beginning of the second Blair government (see 
Figure 1). In each of the years following 2001-2002, 
the HSE began to face real-terms cuts in funding 
from the government’s grant-in-aid budget.6 The 
HSE is grossly under-staffed. At its peak, in 1994, the 
number of HSE staff in post was 4,545. Since that 
time, numbers have ﬂ uctuated, but there has been a 
clear decline in the total number of staff employed 
by HSE since 2001-2002. On 1 April 2002 there were 
4,282 staff in post and on 1 April 2006 there were 
3,991 staff in post.7 Of those staff, 1,5438  are currently 
deployed as frontline inspectors (there were 1,625 on 
1 April 2002). To put this in perspective, the number 
5 This ratio is based on ﬁ gures 
available for the most recent 
available year, 2006-07.
6 See HSE data supplied 
to the CCA, http://www.
corporateaccountability.org/HSE/
resources/table97to06.html.
7 180 staff were transferred from 
HSE to the new rail regulator, ORR, 
on 1 April 2006 (HSC, 2006-2007). 
We have included 180 ‘lost’ staff in 
this ﬁ gure to allow for comparisons 
to be made across time. 
8 95 inspectors were transferred 
from HSE to the new rail regulator, 
ORR, on 1 April 2006 (Hansard, 15 
January 2007, col. 888W).  We have 
included 95 ‘lost’ inspectors in this 
ﬁ gure to allow for comparisons to 
be made across time.
www.crimeandjustice.org.uk
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of frontline HSE inspectors equates to less than 9 
per cent of the number of new police community 
support ofﬁ cers that the government has pledged to 
fund by the end of 2008.  
The steady erosion of HSE resources has certainly 
had an impact on the morale of the organisation 
and its conﬁ dence to lobby government for the 
resources it needs. One indication of this lack of 
conﬁ dence is that the HSE has, in recent years, 
refrained from making any budgetary demands 
upon government. The following exchange 
between Geoffrey Podger, HSE chief executive, 
and Michael Jabez Foster, MP at a sitting of 
the Department for Work and Pensions Select 
Committee, in May 2006, is instructive:
Foster: …. in 2003... you had 1,651 frontline inspec-
tors, in 2004 1,604 and in 2005 1,530. What is the best 
number to have? Is it better to have 1,600 or 1,500? 
Podger: The honest answer to that is that nobody 
actually knows, and if I may say so, having worked in 
other enforcement areas...
Foster: So why do we not have 300?
Podger: Why indeed?…                 
(Cited in CCA, 2007)
This exchange shows how far senior HSE 
figures are prepared to go to assert that no 
extra resources are needed to ‘do the job’. It is a 
measure of its own demoralisation, while also 
confirming HSE’s own assessment (no matter 
how misguided) that to argue for increased 
resources from the current government is futile. 
It is hardly a view shared by Prospect, the union 
that represents frontline inspectors. Back in 2004, 
Prospect recommended to the Department for 
Work and Pensions Select Committee that the 
number of field inspectors should be doubled – a 
proposal which the committee endorsed (House 
of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee, 
2004, recommendation 9); thus last year Prospect 
claimed that the HSE ‘cannot meet its public 
expectations to advise, inspect and enforce 
workplace health and safety’ (Hazards, 2007).  
The position adopted by senior management at the 
HSE appears even more remarkable in the context 
of debates on resources for policing. It is difﬁ cult to 
imagine any police ofﬁ cer in any police force area in 
the country relinquishing a claim to more ofﬁ cers or 
a larger budget – despite the fact that numbers of 
police ofﬁ cers are at an all-time high.  
3,400
3,500
3,600
3,700
3,800
3,900
4,000
4,100
4,200
4,300
4,400
1.
4.
20
07
FIGURE 1 : HSE STAFF IN POST 
Sources: HSC, 2002; HSC, 2007; HSC/HSE, 2004; House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2004
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the reduction in inspections and changes in the form 
of regulatory intervention, features of the regulatory 
climate to which we will return.
The Hampton agenda
It was in 2004, towards the end of its second period 
in ofﬁ ce, that New Labour’s long-term plans for a 
reconstructed system of corporate crime regulation 
became fully apparent. In March of that year, the 
Treasury under Gordon Brown established the 
Hampton Review to ‘consider the scope for reducing 
administrative burdens on business by promoting 
more efﬁ cient approaches to regulatory inspection 
and enforcement without reducing regulatory 
outcomes’ (Hampton, 2005). The report – tellingly 
entitled Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective 
Inspection and Enforcement (ibid) – called for more 
focused inspections, greater emphasis on advice and 
education and, in general, for removing the ‘burden’ 
of inspection from most premises. Speciﬁ cally, 
Hampton called for the reduction of inspections 
by up to a third (across all regulatory agencies, this 
would equate to one million fewer inspections) 
and in their place recommended that regulators 
make much more ‘use of advice’ to business. Also, in 
March 2005, the Cabinet Ofﬁ ce’s Better Regulation 
Task Force published its review of regulation, Less 
is More: Reducing Burdens, Improving Outcomes. This 
proposed a crude mechanism for controlling the 
regulatory ‘burden’, a ’one in, one out‘ approach 
to regulation, whereby all new regulations were 
to be accompanied by the withdrawal of existing 
regulations (Better Regulation Task Force, 2005). 
The recommendations of these reports came 
together in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform 
Act, which passed into law in November 2006. 
The aim of the law is to ‘enable delivery of swift 
and efﬁ cient regulatory reform to cut red tape’ 
(Cabinet Ofﬁ ce, 2006). The Act itself is therefore 
framed by ‘burdens on business’ rhetoric, a 
rhetoric that juxtaposes economic success with 
overbearing investigation and enforcement. Thus, 
section 1 of the Act creates a remarkable new 
power for a minister of the Crown to make an 
order that removes from government a ‘regulatory 
burden’, deﬁ ned in the Act as a ‘ﬁ nancial cost’, an 
‘administrative inconvenience’ or ‘an obstacle to 
efﬁ ciency, productivity or proﬁ tability’. 
The impact of Hampton was an intensiﬁ cation of an 
already ﬁ ercely anti-regulation political climate. And 
The second tendency that has inﬂ uenced the 
decriminalisation of safety crimes is the post-
1997 consolidation of the government’s ‘burdens 
on business’/‘anti-red tape’ agenda. In 1997, the 
Conservative’s ﬂ agship Deregulation Unit was 
renamed the Better Regulation Unit, with the Better 
Regulation Task Force established in the Cabinet 
Ofﬁ ce, a strong indication that things were not 
going to get better for the victims of corporate 
crime. Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) 
were introduced the following year. In 1999, the 
role of the Better Regulation Unit (renamed the 
Regulatory Impact Unit) was extended with a remit 
to ensure that RIAs were being implemented across 
government departments. RIAs aim to measure 
the costs and beneﬁ ts of reforms on business, 
consumers, third-sector organisations and public 
authorities of all proposed policy and legislative 
reforms. However, their emergence and inclusion at 
the heart of the government’s burdens on business 
agenda is a clear indication that the primary 
function of RIAs in practice has been to pre-empt 
and minimise legislative and regulatory cost impacts 
upon business. The effect has been a disciplinary 
one: to formalise a pro-business/deregulation frame 
of reference for policy making across government. 
In November 2007, a new system of impact 
assessments replaced RIAs. The new system was 
aimed explicitly at embedding the principle that all 
new regulation is to be carried out with minimum 
burdens on business (Cabinet Ofﬁ ce, 2007).
In March 2004, a HSC internal document noted 
tellingly that ’there has been deregulatory pressure 
from within government to reduce burdens on 
business… HSE has responded positively’ (Hazards, 
2004).  Figures released recently following a 
freedom of information request to the HSE by 
Hazards Magazine indicate that the burdens on 
business agenda had initiated a gradual decline in 
regulatory interventions in the HSE. For example, 
according to the Field Operations Directorate 
ﬁ gures, the largest division of the HSE, there was 
a 26 per cent fall in inspections and a 19 per cent 
fall in regulatory contacts between 2002-2003 and 
2004-2005 (O’Neill, 2006). 
It is clear, then, that in the early 2000s, the HSE found 
itself under pressure on two fronts: ﬁ rst, in terms of the 
momentum given to the burdens on business agenda, 
and second from a real-terms cut in resources that is 
clearly indicated by the reduction in staff in post. This 
is the political context within which we can appreciate 
www.crimeandjustice.org.uk
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nowhere was its impact absorbed more consciously 
than in the health and safety regulator. In July 2005, 
the HSC launched its own review of regulation under 
the rubric of ‘a debate on the causes of risk aversion 
in health and safety’. HSE deputy director general 
Jonathan Rees noted, ’HSE’s approach to regulation is 
very much based on sensible risk management. Risk 
is ubiquitous. Some degree of risk, whether ﬁ nancial, 
environmental or in terms of safety is necessary 
for progress.’ The HSE’s draft ‘simpliﬁ cation’ plans, 
published in November 2005, promoted a ‘risk-based, 
targeted approach to enforcement’ that was to be 
supported by a 33 per cent reduction in inspections 
(Hazards, 2006).
These anti-regulatory initiatives reached their high 
point in the new Regulatory Code (DBERR, 2007), 
published by the newly formed Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, one of 
Gordon Brown’s ﬁ rst initiatives when he ﬁ nally made 
it to Number 10 in the summer of 2007. This code 
was introduced to address how ‘the few businesses’ 
(para. 8) that break the law should be handled. In 
general, regulators, including the HSE, were advised: 
’By facilitating compliance through a positive and 
proactive approach, regulators can achieve higher 
compliance rates and reduce the need for reactive 
enforcement actions‘ (para. 8); they ’should seek to 
reward those regulated entities that have consistently 
achieved good levels of compliance through positive 
incentives, including lighter inspections and less 
onerous reporting requirements‘ (para. 8.1); they 
should also ’take account of the circumstances of 
small regulated entities, including any difﬁ culties they 
may have in achieving compliance‘ (para. 8.1). 
If the rationale for these new realities of regulation 
was not clear enough, the document formalised 
the emerging conﬂ ict of interest for regulatory 
bodies when it emphasised that ’[r]egulators should 
recognise that a key element of their activity will 
be to allow, or even encourage, economic progress 
and only to intervene when there is a clear case for 
protection’ (para. 3).
The Hampton Review and the reforms that followed 
have extended considerably the scope and reach of 
the burdens on business agenda into the day-to-
day work of inspectors. Regulators are increasingly 
pressurised into prioritising the interests of the 
regulated above the protection of the workforce. 
The post-Hampton agenda has therefore further 
marginalised the enforcement role of the HSE and 
given renewed momentum to New Labour’s pro-
business trajectory.
Trends in under-enforcement
It would be difﬁ cult, and we believe unwise, to 
construct an argument that directly links the 
ﬂ uctuations in enforcement policy to particular 
political decisions or events. We do not attempt to 
do this here. However, we can draw conclusions from 
the general patterns that can be observed across 
enforcement data; and we can only understand those 
patterns in the context of the unfolding political 
strategy outlined above. We have already noted 
that there are clear signs of a general decrease in 
HSE resources, and frontline inspector numbers in 
particular, around 2002-2003, as well as a downturn 
in inspection and particular forms of regulatory 
activity since 2002-2003. Figure 2 indicates two clearly 
differentiated periods of decline in prosecution, 
following an initial rise in the period after the election 
of the ﬁ rst New Labour government. The ﬁ rst occurred 
roughly between 1999-2000 and 2003-2004 (a 16 
per cent fall) and the second was a sharper decline 
between 2003-2004 and 2005-2006 (a 38 per cent fall). 
The data on enforcement notices, indicated by 
Figure 3, appear to tell a slightly different story. The 
steady rise in the number of notices reaches a peak 
in 2002-2003 and then begins to fall back to a point 
roughly around 1996-1997 levels. We can therefore 
make an interesting observation about the data 
we have looked at so far: that while enforcement 
notices are at roughly the same levels as they were 
when Labour came to power, the level of prosecution 
is signiﬁ cantly lower. Moreover, if we look at how 
the patterns vary between local authority and HSE 
enforcement, we ﬁ nd that HSE trends are much 
more volatile than local authority trends. Indeed, in 
so far as there has been a collapse in enforcement 
since around 2003, this collapse is much clearer in 
HSE enforcement. In the local authority sector, the 
clearest trend has been the shift from prosecution 
to the use of enforcement notices – to the point 
that local authorities in 2005-2006 issued more 
enforcement notices than the HSE. 
If we explore these data by separating out 
improvement notices from prohibition notices, 
something very interesting happens. There appears 
to have been an increase in the use of improvement 
notices at the beginning of the ﬁ rst New Labour 
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FIGURE 2 : HSE AND LOCAL AUTHORIT Y PROSECUTIONS
Source: HSE Enforcement Statistics, available online at:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/enforce/index-ld.htm#table1; p=provisional
Note that where HSE data refer to ‘prosecutions’, this denotes the number of breaches prosecuted, not the number of 
cases laid.   See http://bre.berr.gov.uk/regulation/documents/compliance_code/draft/compliance_code_final.pdf. 
F IGURE 3 : HSE AND LOCAL AUTHORIT Y ENFORCEMENT NOTICES
 Source: HSE Enforcement Statistics, available online at:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/enforce/index-ld.htm#table1
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government and then recently a sharp decline 
in this form of enforcement, whereas the use of 
prohibition notices is more or less constant. This may 
demonstrate two different aspects of the change 
in enforcement strategy over the past ten years. 
First, because improvement notices do not impose 
an immediate cessation of work unlike prohibition 
notices (nor are they likely to lead to criminal 
prosecution), HSE inspectors can be more conciliatory 
and less antagonistic when they uncover breaches 
or potential breaches of the law. It appears that the 
period following the election of the 1997 Labour 
government led to an immediate and dramatic use of 
improvement notices, a trend that was then reversed 
from 2002-2003 onwards. When considered together 
with the prosecution data, these ﬁ gures indicate that 
it is the most discretionary forms of enforcement 
action which have been most vulnerable to New 
Labour’s burdens on business policies. 
What this indicates is that the current political 
climate has undermined both prosecution and less 
adversarial forms of enforcement – a contradiction 
at the heart of arguments for such an approach to 
regulatory enforcement. 
Second, the lack of movement in the number 
of prohibition notices issued, as indicated in 
Figure 4, rather than reﬂ ecting a consistent use 
of this form of enforcement per se, may actually 
indicate a tendency to use such notices (even in 
a less enforcement-minded context) in place of 
prosecutions. That is, where pressure on resources 
is intensifying, and where there is a political 
mood against the use of prosecutions, it may be 
increasingly difﬁ cult for frontline inspectors to 
justify the reasons for, and the costs entailed in, 
taking a prosecution. It is less resource intensive, 
and probably less politically difﬁ cult, to opt for a 
prohibition notice rather than a prosecution. This 
would account for the trend in prohibition notices 
holding up as prosecutions have declined. One 
frontline HSE inspector remarked on this trend to 
us, noting that, in the current period, ‘being a good 
thief taker counts for nothing’.
CONCLUSION
What we have described in this brieﬁ ng is a series of 
ﬁ lters that distort and misrepresent the ﬁ gures for 
deaths and injuries at work. The consequences of 
these ﬁ lters are:
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FIGURE 4 : IMPROVEMENT AND PROHIBITION NOTICES
Source: HSE Enforcement Statistics, available online at:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/enforce/index-ld.htm#table1
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● A large hidden ﬁ gure of crime – with at best, and 
on conservative assumptions, only one-ﬁ fth to 
one-sixth of recorded fatalities and a much smaller 
fraction of injuries ever being included in the 
headline ﬁ gure.
● The vast majority of deaths and perhaps 90 per 
cent of reported major injuries not being subject 
to any form of investigation.
● Where deaths and injuries are investigated, few are 
prosecuted.
Yet we still end up with some quite remarkable 
statistics as a result of these unremarkable ﬁ lters: a 
ratio of 125:1 for those injuries that are recorded and 
for which prosecutions are taken; and a ratio of more 
than 7:1 between notices issued on the one hand 
and prosecutions on the other. 
What is also remarkable about these unremarkable 
processes is how they attract little or no popular, 
political or academic attention. Just as remarkable 
here is the contrast between this deafening silence 
on the one hand and the ongoing moral panic that 
characterises social responses to most ‘mainstream’ 
violent crime on the other. The latter attracts censure, 
controversy, political dispute and is prioritised in the 
criminal justice system, as well as, of course, being 
allocated criminal justice energy and resources.
Recent trends in HSE activity all point to a crisis 
in enforcement. With a reduction in scheduled 
inspections and other visible shifts away from 
enforcement activity, it is inevitable that fewer 
safety crimes will be brought to the attention of 
regulatory authorities and the courts – so the 
ﬁ lters alluded to in this brieﬁ ng will become even 
more powerful. Low rates of prosecution for safety 
crimes can be explained both by a government 
campaign to undermine regulatory enforcement 
and by the acceptance on the part of the HSE of 
the commercial imperatives of the government’s 
burdens on business agenda. The policy shift 
towards a model of self-regulation that became 
most pronounced in the second Blair government 
– of which the Hampton Review, the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act and the new Regulatory 
Code are the key outcomes – is driving down levels 
of prosecution and enforcement. This is sending 
a clear, calculated message to corporate criminals 
that, under New Labour, they will be even freer to 
kill and injure with impunity.
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The What is crime? project aims to stimulate debate about what crime is, 
what it isn’t and who gets to decide. The project is focused on the themes of 
violence, ﬁ nance and the environment.
Visit our website to ﬁ nd out more about other What is crime? activities 
underway in 2008/9 which include mini-inquiries, research and policy brieﬁ ngs 
and a national photography competition to be launched in late 2008.
Some quick facts about safety crimes
●  You are two to three times more likely to be killed by a  
 work related incident than a homicide.
●  Almost nine out of ten major injuries known to the Health 
 and Safety Executive are not investigated.
●  There has been a 37 per cent decline in Health and Safety  
 Executive prosecutions in the last four years.
●  Only about a quarter of reportable non-fatal injuries to  
 employees are actually reported by employers.
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